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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXPANDS THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE TO INCLUDE NONMILITARY
CONTRACTORS
In Carley v. Wheeled Coach,' the Third Circuit extended the scope of
the government contractor defense established by the Supreme Court in
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.2 to contractors manufacturing products
under contracts with government agencies other than the military.' The
Third Circuit is the first circuit court to extend the government contractor
defense to nonmilitary government contractors.
The government contractor defense is an affirmative defense under
"general federal common law."5 If government contractors satisfy certain
specific requirements,' they may use the defense to bar various state law
1. 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 191 (1993).
2. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
3. See Carley, 991 F.2d at 1123. For criticism of the possibility of this extension, see Harry A.
Austin, Comment, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: A Questionable Expansion of the
Government Contractor Defense, 23 GA. L. REv. 227 (1988) (attributing the uncertainty surrounding
the application of the Boyle defense to the defense's broad foundation).
4. See Carley, 991 F.2d at 1130 (Becker, J., dissenting). But see Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a manufacturer of an air conditioning unit for the Hawk
Missile System Mobile Repair Unit could assert the government contractor defense). See also Johnson
v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding that a manufacturer of postal vehicles
was entitled to immunity under the government contractor defense).
Congress has never spoken on the issue of immunity for nonmilitary government contractors. Justice
Brennan, in his Boyle dissent, stated that Congress' silence regarding the creation of the government
contractor defense was "conspicuous," and should have signaled the Court that it should not judicially
create what Congress refused to legislate. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing H.R.
4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (limiting civil liability of government contractors); S. 2441, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (same); H.R. 2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (permitting indemnification
of civil liability for government contractors); H.R. 5883, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (same); H.R. 1504,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (same); H.R. 5351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (same)).
5. Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 248 n.12 (5th Cir. 1990). The
government contractor defense is not an affirmative defense to claims alleging defective manufacture,
but it is a defense to claims alleging injury caused by a product manufactured for the government. Id.
at 248.
6. For a discussion of the specific elements of the government contractor defense, see infra notes
40-42 and accompanying text.
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tort claims7 brought by individuals alleging injury caused by a product
manufactured for the government.' The defense essentially extends the
government's sovereign immunity to government contractors. 9  By
extending this immunity to nonmilitary contractors, the Third Circuit
departed from the reasoning of the other courts which have ruled on this
issue subsequent to the Boyle decision. Focusing on the Carley decision,
this Recent Development evaluates the arguments for and against extending
the government contractor defense to nonmilitary contractors. The author
ultimately concludes that expansion is inappropriate because the extension
of the defense will leave many tort victims without state law remedies.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, two circuits had applied
the government contractor defense to bar a state tort claim against a
nonmilitary government contractor. The Eleventh Circuit, in Burgess v.
Colorado Serum Co.,'0 refused to limit the government contractor defense
to manufacturers of military products. In Burgess, a veterinarian lost his
finger to amputation after accidentally injecting it with a vaccine manufac-
tured pursuant to a contract with the federal government." The veterinari-
an and his wife brought tort claims against the manufacturer based on
7. Tort claims that may be barred by the government contractor defense include design defect,
failure to warn, strict liability, wrongful death, products liability, and breach of warranty. See, e.g.,
Sundstrom v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 816 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the
government contractor defense barred a design defect claim brought by widows and minor children of
pilots killed in a midair collision); Wilson v. Boeing Co., 655 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding
that a contractor was shielded from liability for defective design because it had complied with the
government's design specifications); Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.
II1. 1989) (holding that the government contractor defense applies to failure to warn claims); Nicholson
v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn. 1988) (same); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that strict liability action was barred by the government
contractor defense under Pennsylvania law); In re Aircraft Crash Litigation, Frederick, Maryland, May
6, 1981, 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd sub nom., Darling v. Boeing Co., 935 F.2d 269 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that manufacturers and contractors were entitled to immunity under the government
contractor defense against strict liability and breach of express or implied warranty claims); Landgraf
v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 993 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 553 (1993)
(finding a wrongful death action barred by the government contractordefense); Galik v. Kent Meters
Ltd., 727 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Ala. 1989) (same); Lewis v. Babcock Indus., 985 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993) (holding that a products liability suit was barred by the government
contractor defense).
8. See supra note 5.
9. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). In Boyle, the United States
Supreme Court stated: "It makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for
the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces
the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production." Id.
10. 772 F.2d 844 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
11. Id. at 845.
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negligence and manufacturer's liability under Alabama law. 2 The district
court held that Alabama's government contractor defense barred the suits,
and granted the defendant manufacturer summary judgment on both
claims. 3 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
decision.1 4  The circuit court conceded that the government contractor
defense had been applied primarily to military contractors.'5 However, the
circuit court granted immunity for the nonmilitary contractor in this case
because it viewed the defense as an extension of the government's
sovereign immunity: 6 if manufacturers could prove the elements of the
defense,' 7 and that they had acted in the place of the federal government,
then the defense should be available to them regardless of the nonmilitary
nature of the product.'
In Boruski v. United States, 9 the Seventh Circuit cited Burgess
approvingly and held that Illinois' government contractor defense was
available to nonmilitary contractors. In Boruski, a seventy-one-year-old
woman contracted a paralytic and degenerative nervous system condition
as the result of receiving a vaccine for which the United States government
had contracted.2" The Seventh Circuit denied the woman's claim for
damages against the contractor. The court concluded that contractors acting
in the place of the federal government should not be held liable if the
federal government would not be held liable for performing the same
work.2'
12. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the label on the vaccine did not provide sufficient warning of
the vaccine's danger to humans. Id.
13. The Burgess court was determining whether the Alabama Supreme Court would apply the
defense to a claim under the Alabama Extended Liability Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. Id. The
parties conceded that the government contractor defense barred recovery on the negligence claim. Id.
14. Burgess, 772 F.2d at 847.
15. Id. at 846.
16. Id.
17. The Burgess court used the following formulation of the government contractor defense. The
defendant must prove: (1) that the government established the specifications for the product, (2) "that
the product met the government specifications in all material respects"; and (3) "that the government
knew as much or more than the defendant about the hazards that accompanied the use of the product."
772 F.2d at 846.
1S. Id. The court stated: "Both the history of the defense and its general rationale lead us to the
conclusion that it would be illogical to limit the availability of the defense solely to 'military'
contractors." Id.
19. 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 1423.
21. Id. at 1430. "If a contractor has acted in the sovereign's stead and can prove the elements of
the defense, then he should not be denied the extension of sovereign immunity that is the government
contractor defense." Id. (quoting Burgess, 772 F.2d at 846).
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In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,2 the Supreme Court articulated
the standards for applying the government contractor defense. Boyle
involved a wrongful death action brought against the manufacturer of a
United States Marine Corps helicopter.' The plaintiff brought two claims
under Virginia tort law and prevailed at trial.24 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit held that the federal government contractor defense barred recovery
on the state law claims." The Fourth Circuit based its explanation of the
defense on the rationale of Feres v. United States.26 The Feres doctrine
immunizes a government contractor from state law tort claims whenever the
contractor acts in the federal government's stead and the government could
not be held liable for the same act.' By adopting the Feres doctrine, the
Fourth Circuit held, in effect, that general federal common law preempted
22. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The Supreme Court was called on to settle a circuit split in Boyle. The
Fourth and Ninth Circuits disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit, not on the validity of the government
contractor defense, but rather on the proper formulation of the standards for determining whether a
contractor can successfully raise that defense. The Fourth Circuit adopted the formulation of the
government contractor defense that the Ninth Circuit had utilized in McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
704 F.2d 444,451 (9th Cir. 1983). See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (1986). See
infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985),
articulated the defense differently. The Shaw test would bar a contractor's liability only if "(1) the
contractor did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of the defective equipment;
or (2) the contractor timely warned the Government of the risks of the design and notified it of
alternative designs reasonably known by it, and the Government, although forewarned, clearly
authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design." Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988) (citing Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746).
The Court adopted the Fourth Circuit's formulation from Boyle, and rejected the Shaw test because
it did not adequately protect "the federal interest embodied in the 'discretionary function' exemption"
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id.
23. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502. The decedent survived the crash of his CH-53D helicopter, but when
he was unable to escape from the helicopter, he drowned in the Atlantic Ocean. Id.
24. Id. at 503. One claim asserted that the helicopter had been repaired defectively. The other
claim alleged that the helicopter's escape apparatus had been designed defectively. The plaintiff
received a jury verdict for $725,000. Id.
25. Boyle v. United Technologies, 792 F.2d 413, 414 (1986).
26. Id. See also Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (adopting, for the first time
in the Fourth Circuit, this formulation of the government contractor defense).
The Feres doctrine arose from Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). In Feres the Supreme
Court held that the FTCA does not allow a cause of action to a member of the armed services who
suffered service-related injuries. Id. at 146. This doctrine was extended in Stencel Aero-Engineering
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel the Supreme Court held that the federal
government had no duty under the FTCA to indemnify a third-party, government military subcontractor
that was found liable for a serviceperson's injuries. Id. at 673.
27. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. See also McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449-51 (9th
Cir. 1983).
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state tort law.2" This holding was unusual because state law is typically
preempted only by federal statutory law.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the dispute between the
circuits.3" The Court acknowledged that absent clear statutory authoriza-
tion to preempt state law, or a direct conflict between federal and state law,
federal law typically would not preempt state law.3' However, if the state
law at issue significantly conflicts with a "uniquely federal interest,"32 the
state law may be preempted by federal common law. The Court decided
that suits brought against contractors who manufacture products for the
28. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. Cf Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)
(discussing the strict requirements for preemption of state law by federal common law).
29. Courts hesitate to find a state law preempted by federal law. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUIONAL LAw 479 n.7 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe states: "The Supreme Court has referred
to this reluctance as a presumption that 'Congress did not intend to displace state law."' (citing
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
Generally, federal law will preempt state law in three specific situations. First, Congress may
expressly preempt state law. Second, preemption may be inferred from the structure or goal of a federal
law. Finally, preemption of state law may be necessary if it conflicts with federal law, or prevents
attainment of a federal goal. TRIBE, supra, at 481 n.14.
30. The plaintiffpetitioned for certiorari arguing that, in the absence of legislation, the government
contractor defense had no basis; that the Fourth Circuit's requirements were inappropriate; and further,
that the Fourth Circuit erred in not remanding for a jury trial. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503-04. Certiorari
was granted in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 479 U.S. 1029 (1987).
31. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (1988) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977);
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
32. Boyle, 500 U.S. at 507. The Boyle Court posed a hypothetical situation to demonstrate when
a conflict will not be found. Id. It is conceivable, according to the Boyle majority, that a manufacturer
who produces a product according to federal specifications could still be held liable for not installing
a state-required safety feature that does not conflict with the government's specifications. Id. at 509.
The Court also stated that when the government orders equipment from stock without specifying any
of the product's features, "it is impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that
particular feature." Id.
In In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 715 F. Supp. 298 (D. Haw. 1988), affd, 960 F.2d 806 (9th
Cir. 1992), the district court did not find a significant conflict between state law and a uniquely federal
interest, because the government contract in question did not prevent the manufacturer from complying
with a state-imposed duty to warn. Id. at 299-300. See also In re Joint Eastern and Southern District
New York Asbestos Litigation, 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Boyle defense can be
applied to bar state failure to warn claims if the government "dictated" the nature of the warning in
addition to the specifics of the product); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., 716 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Fla.
1989), affid, 898 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that Navy specifications for a product did not
conflict with a state imposed duty to warn of hazards).
For a discussion of the potential application of the Boyle defense to bar state tort claims against
asbestos manufacturers, see S. Michael Scadron, The New Government Contractor Defense: Will It
Insulate Asbestos Manufacturers from Liability for the Harm Caused by Their Insulation Products?,
25 IDAHo L. REv. 375 (1988-89).
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government involve two "uniquely federal interests": (1) having federal
contracts governed by federal law, and (2) having the liability of federal
officials for actions taken in the course of their duty controlled by the
federal government.33 Therefore, the Court held that the federal judiciary
is justified in creating a federal common law defense that bars contractor
liability under state tort law in certain instances.34
The Court outlined this "significant conflict" requirement by referring to
the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA), instead of the Feres doctrine as the
Fourth Circuit had.35 The FTCA statutorily waives the United States'
sovereign immunity,36 but it does not extend to suits arising out of a
government employee's exercise of a discretionary duty or function.37
The Court held that decisions regarding the design of military equipment
33. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-05. The Boyle Court likened the obligations of a government
contractor to those of a federal employee. Id. at 505. The scope of the liability imposed on a federal
official is governed by federal law because otherwise the liability will affect the operations of the
government. The Court noted that the imposition of liability on a government contractor would
similarly affect the terms of government contracts. Id. at 507. The imposition of liability on the
contractor might cause him to raise prices, refuse to use the military specifications, or refuse to contract
for the government at all. Id.
34. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504. Since the holding in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
federal courts have been limited in their ability to create a body of federal common law that would
usurp state law. However, federal courts have continued to exercise their ability to create federal
common law in situations where the state law impinges on a "uniquely federal interest." Boyle, 487
U.S. at 504. The Court discussed two examples of this power in Boyle, id. at 508: Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1943) (holding that federal common law applies in cases
involving the commercial paper of the United States when the United States is a party), and United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 581 (1973) (holding that to permit state legislation
to abrogate the explicit terms of a prior federal land acquisition would seriously impair federal statutory
programs).
35. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Feres doctrine. In Boyle the
Supreme Court rejected the Feres doctrine as the basis for the government contractor defense. 487 U.S.
at 510. The Court concluded that the doctrine was both too broad and too narrow:
Too broad, because if the Government contractor defense is to prohibit suit against the
manufacturer whenever Feres would prevent suit against the Government, then even injuries
caused to military personnel by a helicopter purchased from stock .... or by any standard
equipment purchased by the Government, would be covered .... On the other hand, reliance
on Feres produces (or logically should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow.
Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the military
to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a civilian's suit against the
manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort theory, claiming harm from what is
alleged to be needlessly high levels of noise produced by the jet engines.
Id. at 510-11.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
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are discretionary functions.38 The Court further concluded that if these
discretionary functions were allowed to be "second-guessed" through state
tort suits against government contractors, the financial burden of judgments
against these contractors would be passed through to the government.39
Because the contractor in Boyle manufactured military products, the Court
did not address whether the defense was applicable to nonmilitary
contractors.
After adopting the Fourth Circuit's formulation of the government
contractor defense, the Court established the standards for applying the
defense. First, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the United States
approved "reasonably precise specifications for the manufactured prod-
uct."4  Second, the manufacturer must show that the equipment "con-
formed" to those specifications." Finally, the supplier must have warned
the United States about the dangers in the equipment that were known to
the manufacturer but not to the United States.42
38. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. Military equipment procurement decisions involve the balancing of
military, technical, and social considerations, and therefore, are discretionary decisions. Id.
39. Id. "[N qe are further of the view that permitting 'second guessing' of these judgments...
through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the
FTCA exemption." Id.
40. Id. at 512. Silence in a government contract regarding a specific feature has been held not to
be necessarily inconsistent with a finding of conformity with specifications. Bailey v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993). However, silence with regard to a feature may beg the
question whether the government articulated reasonably precise specifications. Id. at 799 (citing Trevino
v. General, 865 F.2d 1474, 1486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989)).
In Landgrafv. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 993 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
553 (1993), the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether military specifications incorporated by
reference in the design specification for a helicopter involved in a fatal crash, constituted a "reasonably
precise specification" with which the manufacturer was required to comply. Id. at 558. The Sixth
Circuit held that the specifications were only a desirable goal and did not exact compliance from the
manufacturer because the government was aware of and had allowed noncompliance in the past. Id.
at 564. See also Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
defense was not available absent a showing that the government had either provided or approved precise
specifications for the design or manufacture of the product that caused the plaintiff's injury).
41. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
42. Id. If the government continues to use and order the product after discovering a defect, the
manufacturer's duty to inform the government is satisfied. Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83,
89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 3041 (1993). However, if the government merely tolerates a
discovered potential for hazard after the contract has been performed, knowledge of the defect will not
be attributed to the government at the design stage. Id.
The Boyle Court observed:
The first two of these conditions assure that the suit is within the area where the policy of the
'discretionary function' would be frustrated.... The third condition is necessary because, in
its absence, the displacement of state tort law would create some incentive for the
manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since conveying such knowledge might disrupt
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Four justices dissented from the Boyle decision.43  The dissenting
justices argued that only Congress has the power to create a defense of this
type,' and thus, state laws should not be preempted by judicially created
federal laws.45 Justice Brennan's dissent foreshadowed the confusion that
the majority opinion would generate regarding the applicability of the Boyle
defense to nonmilitary contractors. He opined that the "injustice" caused
to state tort law plaintiffs would not be limited to the facts of Boyle, but
rather would be applied just as the Third Circuit applied the defense in
Carley.4
6
Subsequent to the Boyle decision, the issue of whether the government
contractor defense extends to nonmilitary contractors was addressed in
detail by the Ninth Circuit. In Nielson v. George Diamond Vogel Paint
Co.,47 a former civilian painter for the Army Corps of Engineers sued the
manufacturer of paint which he had used in connection with his job and
which he alleged had caused him permanent brain damage.48 The district
court held that the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims were
barred under Idaho's "contracts specifications" defense.49 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit considered the Boyle opinion, but refused to extend the
the contract but withholding it would produce no liability.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
43. The dissenting justices were Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
44. Justice Brennan argued: "Congress ... has remained silent-and conspicuously so, having
resisted a sustained campaign by government contractors to legislate for them some defense. The
Court-unelected and unaccountable to the people-has unabashedly stepped into the breach to
legislate" such a defense. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 4.
Explaining his belief that the creation of this type of defense is a legislative function, Justice Stevens
wrote: "When [a] novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the
efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual
... I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress." Id. at 532 (Stevens, 3,
dissenting).
45. Justice Brennan warned: "Erie was deeply rooted in notions of federalism. . . ." Id. at 517
(Brennan, J., dissenting). "[F]ederal common law cannot supersede state law in vacuo out of no more
than an idiosyncratic determination by five Justices that a particular area is 'uniquely federal."' Id. at
517-18.
46. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan wrote: "[The defense] applies not only to
military equipment like the [helicopter at issue in Boyle], but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-order
gadget that the federal government might purchase after previewing plans-from NASA's Challenger
space shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars." Id.
The majority in Carley used this language to support its conclusion that the Boyle defense was meant
to apply to nonmilitary contractors. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1111, 1119 n.2 (3d Cir.
1993).
47. 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 1451.
49. Id. at 1455.
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federal government contractor defense to nonmilitary contractors.5 °
However, the court affirmed the district court's holding that under Idaho
law the suits were barred by the State's government contractor defense.
5
'
The Nielson court recognized that Boyle had shifted the foundation of the
defense from the Feres doctrine, which focuses specifically on military
activities, to the FTCA, which generally concerns all governmental
actions. 3 The court acknowledged that many commentators viewed this
shift as an indication that the defense is available to all government
contractors. 4 However, the Nielson court refused to preempt state tort
law with the federal contractor defense. The court held that, in the context
of nonmilitary contractors, state tort laws did not significantly conflict with
the "uniquely federal interests" and policies underlying the government
contractor defense.
The Nielson court read Boyle as an affirmation of the reasoning
underlying the Ninth Circuit's prior holding in McKay v. Rockwell
International Corp.5 6 In McKay, the Ninth Circuit stated that the defense
is necessary to assure "military discipline" and to avoid the "second-
guessing" of sensitive military decisions.5 ' The Nielson court recognized
that Boyle expanded the scope of the government contractor defense to
include contractors who manufacture a product designed by the government
in the exercise of a discretionary function.5 8 However, the court stated
that this expansion merely allowed the defense to be applied in claims
arising from nonservice military activities. According to the Nielson court,
the reasons for shielding a contractor with the defense remain rooted in
concerns unique to the military.59 These concerns, considered together
with the inherent interest the government has in preserving its ability to
contract, justify the application of the defense only in cases involving
military contractors. Therefore, in Nielson, the court refused to bar the
state tort claim with the general federal common law government contractor
50. Nielson, 892 F.2d at 1456.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the Feres doctrine.
53. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FTCA.
54. Nielson, 892 F.2d at 1453 (citing Scadron, supra note 32; Austin, supra note 3).
55. Id. at 1456.
56. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1990).
57. Id. at 449.
58. Nielson, 892 F.2d at 1454.
59. Id. at 1454-55.
14431994]
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defense.60
No circuit other than the Ninth addressed the nonmilitary contractor issue
until the Third Circuit decided Carley v. Wheeled Coach.6' Carley arose
from an ambulance accident. The plaintiff worked for the Virgin Islands
Department of Health as an emergency medical technician at St. Croix
Hospital. 6' An ambulance in which the plaintiff was a passenger flipped
over en route to an emergency scene.6' Wheeled Coach, a Florida
corporation, manufactured the ambulance in accordance with a contract
with the United States.' The plaintiff sought damages under the theories
of strict liability and breach of warranty arising from Wheeled Coach's
alleged defective manufacture and design of the ambulance.6' The district
court concluded that the government contractor defense barred the
plaintiffs claims and granted Wheeled Coach's motion for summary
judgment.6
The Third Circuit agreed that the government contractor defense as
construed by Boyle should apply to nonmilitary contractors.67 The court
held that suits against government contractors implicate the government's
unique interest in having its work completed, regardless of whether military
60. Id. at 1455. The court held, however, that under Idaho law the manufacturer could bar the suit
using Idaho's government contractor defense. Id. The court remanded the case for factual
determinations regarding a failure to warn claim. Id.
In re Hawaii FederalAsbestos Cases, the Ninth Circuit again held that the government contractor
defense does not apply to nonmilitary contractors. 960 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1992). As in the
Nielson case, the Hawaii Asbestos court relied heavily on the sections of the Boyle opinion that applied
the Boyle test. 960 F.2d at 810.
61. Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993). The Carley court cited two post-
Boyle cases, Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 217 (W.D. Wis. 1992), and In re
Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818, 823-27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 146 B.R. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
as evidence of a split of opinion over whether the defense should apply in nonmilitary cases. Carley,
991 F.2d at 1119 n.l. However, the court did not rely on either case as precedent for its holding. Id.
62. Id. at 1118.
63. Id. It was reported by a police officer at the scene of the ambulance accident that the
ambulance was driven in a safe and reasonable manner. Id.
64. Id.
65. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1118.
66. Id. The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that Florida law governed the case because Florida
does not recognize as a matter of state law the application of the government contractor defense to
nonmilitary contractors. Id. However, this argument would be moot if the federal version of the
defense applies to nonmilitary contractors.
67. Id. at 1118. The court acknowledged that the Boyle Court applied the defense to a military
contractor, but felt that the reasoning of Boyle broadly encompassed all government contractors. Id.
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contractors or nonmilitary contractors are the subject of the suit.6" The
court quoted language from the Boyle Court stating that liability imposed
on contractors will adversely affect the government's ability to contract.69
The Third Circuit believed the government would endure this same
economic hardship whether the product manufactured by the contractor was
for military or civilian use.7"
The Third Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's shift away from the
Feres doctrine as the basis for the defense indicated a broadening of the
application of the defense to all government contractors. 71  It also
concluded that the federal government's disdain for having its decisions
second-guessed through state tort law decisions is equally strong for both
military and civilian products.72 To further support its holding, the Carley
court relied on the two pre-Boyle decisions, Burgess and Boruski.73
In his dissent in Carley, Judge Becker relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit
post-Boyle decision in concluding that the defense should not apply to
nonmilitary contractors.74 The dissenting judge noted that though certain
of the Court's rationales in Boyle seem to apply to all government
contractors, the defense still should not have been extended to nonmilitary
contractors because contracts for nonmilitary products do not affect national
security.75 Judge Becker also stated that, because the courts in Burgess
and Boruski applied state law versions of the government contractor
defense, those decisions had no bearing on the scope of the federal
government contractor defense.76 The majority dismissed this point with
the observation that both the Burgess and Boruski courts had used federal
authorities to define the scope of their respective state defense.7
The majority and dissenting opinions of Carley demonstrate the problems
68. Id. at 1120.
69. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120 (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507).
70. Id. Indeed, the hardship can be said to be greater when contracts involve civilian products,
for ninety percent of government procurement contracts are for such goods. Austin, supra note 3, at
236.
71. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120-21.
72. Id. at 1121.
73. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text. The Carley court also cited numerous scholars
who have argued that the Boyle decision should apply to nonmilitary contractors. Carley, 991 F.2d at
1123 n.4 (citing four recent law review articles).
74. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1130 n.3 (Becker, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1130 (Becker, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1130 n.2 (Becker, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1123 n.5.
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caused by the Supreme Court's holding in Boyle. By vaguely defining the
scope of the government contractor defense, the Supreme Court left to the
lower courts the task of adding dimension and texture to the defense.
Because the Boyle decision is itself the primary resource available to the
lower courts as they approach this task, interpretations have varied. The
courts that have refused to expand the defense have focused on the specific
military context of Boyle to limit the application of the defense to military
contractors.78 By contrast, the Carley majority relied on the sweeping
policy rationale used by the Court in Boyle to justify its expansion of the
defense to nonmilitary contractors.79
Though the Third Circuit purports to find support in the Boyle decision
for its holding in Carley, it extends the government contractor defense too
far. The Boyle defense should be narrowly construed to apply only to
military contractors. The Supreme Court judicially established the scope
of the government contractor defense in Boyle. Justice Brennan, implicitly,
and Justice Stevens, explicitly, dissented in Boyle on the ground that the
creation of a government contractor defense is a purely legislative
function.80 By interpreting the defense broadly, the Carley court com-
pounded this usurpation of legislative authority.
The Third Circuit in Carley correctly observed that the "uniquely federal
interests" cited in the Boyle case to justify the government contractor
defense are also implicated by nonmilitary contractors. 8 However, in the
absence of national security concerns, the federal interests are not
sufficiently strong to justify extending the defense to nonmilitary contrac-
tors to the detriment of state law tort claimants. The Boyle court developed
its definition of the government contractor defense in a suit involving a
military contractor. A defense that so strongly implicates federalism and
separation of powers concerns should be narrowly construed. Therefore,
any application of the government contractor defense should be limited to
the facts of Boyle.
Congress should pass legislation establishing the existence or nonexis-
tence of the government contractor defense. If Congress chooses to define
the defense legislatively, it should outline whether the defense encompasses
all government contractors or just military contractors. In the absence of
78. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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such legislation, the Supreme Court should limit the Boyle holding to
military contractors.
If nonmilitary government contractors are allowed to assert the
government contractor defense, a large number of state tort claims will be
barred and potentially thousands of plaintiffs will be left without a remedy.
Such a sweeping infringement on states' rights should not be implemented
without Congressional involvement.
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